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BY

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

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TRUE PEDAGOGICS AND FALSE ETHICS.

Morality Cannot be Taught Without Religion.

THE central law of nature is the law of equilibrium. It is the law of rest, not only, but of motion, and of repose in motion; it is the indispensable law of progress. It is not merely coextensive with the law of gravity in the balancing of atoms and in the cycles of the stars. It is as inexorable in the spiritual and moral orders, in the affairs of the human mind and will, in the preservation and advancement of social and civil life. Its violation, if persevered in, always means catastrophe. In human things, where man has the physical power to disregard it, it has always been its own avenger whenever it has been antagonized or set aside or supplanted by arbitrary human provisions. It is not destroyed by being ignored, but with gathered momentum eventually crushes its way through human interference; and then puts equipoise into the ruins, for men to begin again, if they will, as followers and not as founders of nature's laws.

Erroneous theories in philosophical systems and in plans of society and in economics and education, however plausible they may appear as outlined on paper and fortified by the prophecies of enthusiasts

and backed by the hopes and support of the anxious and unthinking multitude, when put upon practical trial, must prove themselves unadapted to the end, in the inevitable retribution which follows rash experiment. Great, practical questions which have come up in the histories of peoples have never received a satisfactory solution where they have not been approached in a spirit of submission to nature's central law.

Unfortunately, grave, practical questions are not always thus approached, to be determined by the standard of unassailable principle, certified fact and the logical consequences. To-day, the shifting restlessness of opinions that rules in social matters seems to bid defiance to the law. In matters of supreme social import we are constantly meeting with some new error rushing in upon a hundred others half applied; and the catastrophe is delayed. Men pass away and their schemes lose the impetus that is born of personal interest; successors are rarely heirs to great enterprise in carrying out the theories of the deposed or the departed. Yet, a certain following often remains; and so it is that now we have a hundred errors jousting for possession of the field. Superadded to disorder we have internal conflict which gives promise that the central law is preparing to manifest itself in a destruction which has not had a parallel in the history of civilizations.

But, why do we stand philosophizing thus boddingly before venturing to put our foot upon the threshold? Because we are about to enter, though it be only in thought, the sanctified precincts of a temple,

the microcosm, the noblest structure reared by the Creator in this His visible creation, the temple of man, sanctified in his origin, sanctified in his destiny, sanctified in Christ by the elevation of human nature to individual, substantial union with the Divine in the personality of the incarnate God.

There are few subjects, outside of those which are handed over to blustering politics and partisan journalism, upon which more is written amongst us to-day than is written upon the subject of education. Where once we had teachers, now we have teachers of teachers. The shelves of the libraries are laden with books, pamphlets, magazines, journals, reviews,—all occupied with the great subject of education. We hear, endlessly, of conferences and conventions and institutes and congresses, called to discuss the ever present question of universal interest. "Views" upon education are always in demand. When "views" upon any subject are in demand, we all know that there are a hundred million orators waiting for their turn to thrill the audience.

But when it comes to a matter such as this, to the discussion of methods of teaching and of subjects to be taught, as everybody has either had an education which he considers best or worse according, perhaps, to the standard of the dollars now in his pocket, or else has not had much of an education and so patronizes or despises education according to the measure of mercantile success or failure which has attended him without it, and as, moreover, there are millions who are passing through that narrow acquaintance which

comes from a year or two of authority in the school-room, and who are, therefore, "enabled to speak from experience,"—it is natural for us to suppose that those who, in the throng, are most competent to speak will find it hard to get even the recognition which is necessary to a hearing.

In upheavals such as that by which we are confronted we usually find some word that seems to reduce and crystallize the matter for discussion. But it is, too often, a crystal with a different face for every looker-on. Here, the word is "pedagogics." Just whisper "pedagogics," and you will evoke the wisdom of the millions, not to listen but to talk.

The name, "pedagogics," is intended to express what we mean by the science—and the art—of education. Originally, the pedagogue (παιδαγωγός) was the slave who led the boy to school and home again. By degrees the name was applied to the teacher, instructor, trainer of every kind, and so the "leading" acquired a broader meaning. So pedagogy (παιδαγωγία) came gradually to signify the entire system pursued in a boy's education. The name pedagogue with other school-terms was adopted into the Latin—for the Romans went to school to Athens. We find them making a distinction between "*paedagogus*" and their quasi-translation of it, "*educator*." Varro says, "*Educat nutrix, instituit paedagogus,*" "the nurse educates, the pedagogue establishes, forms, finishes off." (ap. Non. 5.105.) Seneca tells us: "*Differunt autem paedagogus et praeceptor: nam hujus munus est puerum liberalibus instituere disciplinis; ille proprie custos est vitæ et morum.*" "Peda-

gogue and preceptor differ: the office of the latter is to form (institute) the boy in liberal studies; the former is, properly speaking, the guardian of his life and conduct." (2 Ira, 22.) Flavius Vopiscus states that the two offices were sometimes combined: "*Aliquando tamen paedagogus idem est ac praeceptor qui nempe pueros litteras docet.*" "Sometimes, however, the office of pedagogue is exercised by the preceptor, that is, by the one who teaches the boy literature." (Vopisc. *Bonos.* 14.) Although, as we have seen, Varro said, "the nurse educates," we find Quintilian beginning, "If some one were entrusted to me to be educated as an orator," *Si mihi educandus tradatur orator.*" (1 proem.)

So much for the original meaning of words, from which it is clear that "pedagogy, pedagogics" are very well chosen to indicate what ought to belong to both the earlier and to the academic training in general; and can stand with full propriety for what we may mean by the science and the art of education. Unfortunately, the difficulty begins when we go on to consider what is meant by education. For, the word, education, is very widely taken to mean only a part of what it really means. The laws of conduct, the rules for the building and establishment of character are often assigned a minor place, or are treated as a negligible quantity, in the science of pedagogics as it is understood and taught and applied amongst us to-day.

When you speak of rearing, of founding, of establishing, let us say, a temple, you mean that you intend to build a structure that will be harmoni-

ous in the strength and proportions of walls and foundations and roof. Our pedagogics, if applied to architecture, would mean all walls, without foundation or roof. It would resemble a science that was occupied with walls and windows and mullions and buttresses, with rich columns and carved capitals and bold frescoes and tesselated floors. It would be a science that provided no foundation to rest the structure on, beyond the sands of a shifting philosophy of uncertainty where nothing is fixed ; and which spread above but a roof of paper that could yield no protection and had no binding force upon the walls. Without the strong foundation, all the walls and buttresses and columns, even were they to stand for a while, could not support the roof that would be needed to give the edifice stability, the roof of character and morality which must be the shield of safety to the human temple divine when the storms of adversity come to try it, when the flood-gates of passion are opened upon it. Even under the withering sun of daily life its scant covering will be seared and warped and seamed, until it is blown away by the lightest breeze or washes away under the softest rain to disfigure that very glory beneath, which has been reared upon the quicksand.

What, then, is the matter with our pedagogics, with our systems of teaching? And what should our pedagogics and our teaching be? What do we aim at? Education. The education of what? The education of the man, of the human being. And what is man, the human being? An Angel? No. Then, just only an animal? No. *Paulo minus ab angelis*, a

little less than the angels. Here let us call attention to a fact that prevades the universe ; and which, being thus universal, can be announced as a physical principle or law. We may formulate it in this manner : Whenever there is a substantial union of natures of different orders, such a union, namely, that there results but one individual, separate, complete, and the subject of every affirmation regarding any and all functions of the natures so united, it is universally true that the separate, distinct individuality is supplied by and denominated from that one of the united natures which is of the highest order. The highest nature always dominates and supplies in its higher efficiency for that subsistent individuality which is always found as belonging to the lower nature when it exists apart and independent, but which is lost to the nature of lower order when this is united with a nature of higher order to the formation of an individual which is to be in its totality the subject of all affirmation and denial. In man, we find the animal nature and the free, intelligent, spiritual nature. In man, therefore, the subsistence, the independent individuality is supplied for the unit of being by the free, intelligent soul. In man, we dignify this separate, independent, individual subsistence by the special name of personality. Man is a person.

This prerogative of the highest nature in a substantial union we find all along the scale of being. Take the animal, that is, a being in which the highest nature is of the purely animal order. The animal, besides its special life of sensation, of sense-

perception and locomotion, by which it is characterized, does, nevertheless, exercise as its own certain activities, which, if found apart, would belong to a being of a lower order. It exercises the functions or activities of assimilation, nutrition, growth, reproduction ; and these, apart and not belonging to a being capable of sense activity, are distinctive of plant life and indicate the individual, independent vegetative being. Yet, in the substantial union, this independence disappears, and the plant activity is predicated of the unit which is an animal. And so, again, does the plant take up and control to its own purposes and as a part of its own individuality, the inorganic elements ; and it does this in such a way as to set at naught all laboratory chemistry of these elements as they are found in their independent individuality outside of the living organism. And so all these natures of lower order, animal, plant, mineral, as found in man, lose their independent individuality which is supplied for by the autonomous personality which belongs distinctively to a higher nature in man, namely, the spiritual, free, intelligent nature, the spiritual soul.

Now, what do we want to do? We want to educate the man. How is this to be done? Shall we turn our attention solely to the animal nature, to what is called physical development? Shall our chief aim be to make the man as strong as an ox? Shall we devote our best efforts to the training up of a race of lifters and runners and punchers? The man is a unit ; and in his unity he is subject to the

law of equilibrium. The rule, therefore, should be, so much bodily strength as is requisite to the best development in other lines as demanded by the harmonious development of the whole. To be brief upon this point we may lay down the recognized truth, that there is a due physical development which we can have without devoting our lives to mere physical culture, a development which with moral and mental culture really fits the body to resist disease better than it can be so fitted by turning it into knots of muscle. What is, however, being done today in this regard, is well expressed by a writer in *The Tablet* (Baltimore, Jan., 1894). Amongst other things the writer says: "A dozen years ago a valedictorian could not walk across the campus of any one of the larger colleges without attracting attention. . . . In those days, too, before the deification of muscle, references to 'honor' men were received with applause at college gatherings, and the elevation, boy fashion, of the first scholar of the class was enthusiastically demanded. All this has largely passed away. Graduate gatherings almost exclusively discuss the last foot-ball match or the coming boat race. It is the Hercules on whom attention is riveted. His movements and opinions are followed with eagerness. He is cheered and admired wherever he goes. Where he flourishes new 'students' hasten to enroll themselves. Brain has yielded to brawn.

"This dethroning of the old ideals is unfortunate and serious. . . . The most significant and the saddest feature of the modern athletic craze is the

inspiration given boys and young men to look upon the physical giant as representative of the best manhood, irrespective of mental quality; and an unconscious disregard in youth of those of their fellows whose trained minds and force of character are most in demand in the world outside."

I do not believe that, previous to the month of March, 1897, we shall find it stated in the history of education that the banner of a great university was considered by the students a fit thing to plant beside the arena of a pugilistic prize-fight. And the late fact is all the more intensely suggestive in that the banner was sent three thousand miles across a continent, from a locality which we are so often warned to speak of as the home of enlightened culture and the new haven of classic lore, to the far-off "west," and even to those confines where that "west" is believed by the scholars of the Orient to be "wildest" and most "woolly." Full certain it was to all, from the beginning, that the letter of good wishes and the university standard—as the gage of patriotic partisanship for the Californian against the ambitious Australian, who won, nevertheless, without the inspiration of an academic flag—were not ordered to be sent by the Board of Regents. And, in fact, a few days after the transmission of the ribbons and the billet-doux had been published, so great was the storm of criticism from the daily press, that the students were called upon by the Regents to exonerate the administration from any responsibility in the disgraceful affair; and, forthwith, in the students' Journal there appeared a card to the effect that the students, some

students, were sole authors and abettors in the enterprise.

But, lo! the year was not passed away, when the world was startled and dismayed by the recital of an orgie which has not, to my knowledge, been paralleled in the history of any university, and which took place through the night following the victory of the "foot-ball team" accredited to the same now twice centenarian institute of learning. The affair is recent and well known; and is too painful to be dwelt upon. But I can imagine the spirits of the ten clergymen, the original trustees, who gave their own libraries to the founding of the school, I can see them hovering through that night over that theatre of debauchery, shedding the tears of the righteous, and whispering to one another that it might have been better for them to have burned their books and to have left their children and their grandchildren's grandchildren to read but Bibles at the rustic fireside, rather than that, even at the end of two centuries, the name of their infant school should be used as the pretext for the desecration of the humanity which they had proposed to elevate.

Men, whose lives are given seriously and intelligently to the work of education, and who apply themselves conscientiously to study the influences which have wrought upon it in time, and the consequent results, very naturally take an interest, a sad interest, upon beholding the marks of decay upon any time-honored institute of learning. I do not speak of material decay, of crumbling walls and dismantled spires, of moss upon once worn walks and

of spiders tapestrying deserted corridors. The view of all this might still, indeed, be linked with none but hallowed memories of a career that was noble to the end. But I mean the decay that may be going on at the heart and center of a university's life, though well kept groves and shaven lawns and polished windows and marble halls may bribe the eye by visions of splendor to distract the judgment from passing sentence on the things that are not made with the trowel, the chisel and the saw.

But let us pass on to higher things. Man is not all body. He is especially soul, spiritual soul. And this soul is endowed with intelligence and memory. Man has the power of both receiving and retaining truth : he can acquire knowledge. But what should he learn and how should he learn and how much should he learn? These are the questions which tax the ingenuity of those amongst us who profess to be given to pedagogy or the science of education. One may labor so hard at learning, at the effort to know and to store the memory with knowledge, as to go against the ancient precept of the *mens sana in corpore sano*, that is, of keeping a sound body as the habitat for a sound mind. As it would appear, however, our education is not exposing the body directly to many disadvantageous risks.

But again, this process of mere receptivity and retention may be pushed so far, and so much stress may be laid upon it at a certain stage in the human training where another phase of culture is imperatively demanded for the formation

of the true man, that the result may be very much of a monstrosity when compared with the harmonious standard of the human ideal. We may spend our lives learning ever more and more, learning lists of kings and dates and battles, lists of birds and reptiles and animals and fishes, lists of rocks and strata and minerals and plants, lists of stars and rivers and mountains, lists of algebraical formulæ and of philosophical theories, lists of writers, especially of novelists, and lists of their books and of their fictitious characters. We may make of ourselves living dictionaries and encyclopedias. You might similarly store the phonograph, which would, indeed, be more exact in reproducing what it had received. But with all this, the development may not be a harmonious development of the whole man. The chief part, the entire moral side of human nature may be overlooked. The truly essential office in education, the office of instruction and of drilling in the moral virtues may be neglected or even ignored.

There are two kinds of virtues; that is, we can distinguish two classes of virtues according to the manner in which one may become possessed of the virtue. When we say that a person possesses a given virtue, we do not mean that he has performed an act of that virtue, but that he possesses the power of *readily* performing the act. An individual act is not the virtue. Ten thousand acts are not the virtue, though they may indicate the presence of that ease and readiness which constitute the virtue. The virtue is not merely the radical power by which one is physically capable of performing the act. If the virtue were

the mere physical, untrained power, then, because we all are physically capable of performing an act of patience, we should all be said to possess the virtue of patience; or, to take the case of vice, because we are all physically able to steal, we should consequently be born a race of thieves. A virtue is neither the act, nor the mere physical power to do the act. The virtue is, to use the strict terminology, the *expedited* power. It is the *habit* of the act, possessed to the degree, that, when the occasion calls for an act of the virtue in question, such act can be readily and easily elicited. A virtue, then, is simply the habit. There are two ways in which one may become possessed of the habit. The habit may be infused or it may be acquired, and we have, accordingly, two classes, the infused and the acquired virtues. There are some virtues that cannot be acquired, that have to be infused. These are the supernatural virtues, the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity. We do not possess the radical power to elicit one act of these virtus. But for all the other virtues—styled moral virtues—we do possess the radical power, and this, too, speaking in the purely natural sense. We do not, indeed, possess the readiness and ease, the *expedited* power, the habit, the virtue: this has to be acquired. I do not say that the Founder of human nature cannot, if He so pleases, bestow the ready habit of a moral virtue, or that He does not here and there bestow it for his own special designs. But all this is outside of our question, and it is something which we are not authorized to reckon upon for ourselves or for any one else. The regular, natural

order, as we know it, for these natural virtues is, that the radical power can be brought by training, only, to the condition of readiness and responsive alacrity which constitutes the habit. The virtue, the ease and readiness of habit, must be the result of exercise. A virtue being a habit, is to be acquired in the way in which other habits are acquired, namely, by a repetition of acts. It is by repetition of acts that we acquire ease and readiness in memorizing, in speaking a new language, in adding numbers, in swimming, in skating, in catching a ball, in singing, in writing with a pen, etc. And so effective is the repetition of act in the formation of habit, that we can form even a strong inclination to something to which we may have felt a great repugnance, thus establishing what we call a "second nature," which prompts us to do unconsciously that which cost us quite a struggle when we first attempted it. Now, the difference between a virtue and a vice is this : a virtue is the habit of some good, whilst a vice is the habit of some evil. These virtues are called moral virtues, because they regard the morality (*mores*) which man is bound to aim at for the perfecting of his being.

It is by the exercise of the habits of the moral virtues that man's great work in life is to be done. And it is a far harder task to form a single moral virtue than to become a philosopher, a puncher or a mathematical phenomenon. There is no natural way of acquiring the virtue but by instruction, study, discipline and exercise. One may learn practically the rules for government in the syntax of a foreign

language in less time than it will take him to become proficient in the government of his temper. Strangely enough, we find many a student applying himself a thousand times more assiduously to the mastery of the unruly syntax than to the mastery of his unruly temper. Yet the control of his temper is vastly more important to him than the habit of the foreign syntax, not only in his separate individual existence, but in his domestic life, in his social life, in his commercial and professional pursuits, and in his civil life. It is, indeed, the control and judicious exercise of the emotions, it is the possession and practice of the moral virtues, that prove the man to be a man, first in his unseen life and then in his dealings with his family, with his friends, with the commonwealth. The exercise of the hidden virtues, of the domestic and social virtues, is a thing that enters into the daily life of every man. The astronomy and chemistry and algebra and smattering of languages, that absorb the time and energies of the period of formation, are things that enter into the after-life of very few.

We say a man is a *man* when we see him exercising an act of forgiveness, of alms-giving, of sympathy, of humility, or justice, of self-sacrifice, and so on. But we never say a man is a *man*, for the reason that he has spent so many years at school and college, stuffing his head with physiology and botany and French and mineralogy and with all the ologies on the list. Hence, the better education is, necessarily, the one that forms to the civil, social and domestic virtues which make the *man*,—the man that is needed in the family, in society, in the state, in every civic role,

whether as a public servant holding the trust of the people or as an unnoticed individual lending the unit of his righteousness to the momentum which must carry forward as a mass the aggregate of the civilized community.

It is these virtues, and these alone, that can harmonize the inequalities between the powerful and the weak, between the rich and the poor, between the lettered and the unlettered, between the employer and the employed. It is these virtues, and these alone, that can bring out and emphasize the dignity of humanity on all sides, and obviate that calamity which observant students tell us is impending over the world, namely, the formation of two classes with opposing motive forces: tyrants on the one hand and serfs on the other; drivers on the one hand and beasts of burden on the other; the proud, the haugthy, the selfish, the scornful on the one hand,—the irritated, the revengeful, the desperate on the other; two aggregates with opposing momenta that will not be equilibrated until they collide and reduce one another to powder.

Now, it has so happened, that very widely, for a time, amongst us, this higher, this highest education, this moral education, this training in the moral virtues has been swept away from the curriculum: so that the knowledge of it has not entered, at all, into the programme which the teacher must follow in order to qualify, or into the discipline and examinations which the student must go through in order to graduate. The consequence is that, education having

run its course for a generation or two with the most important factor, the indispensable factor, excluded from the formula for the problem of human life, wise men are at length awakening, startled by the awful logic of results. And so it is that we have, now, what we may call an ethical movement in education.

It is easy to see a mote that is in our neighbor's eye, and to be at the same time utterly unconscious of the beam that is in our own. As citizens of the Republic of the United States of America, this wonderful foundation of Providence in the new world, we very naturally take an exceptional interest in those who have been our imitators in the old world. We take a special interest in the fortunes of the Republic of France. Over there, between 1876 and 1880, there was inaugurated a great crusade to establish schools without the only effective basis for practical morality. Being a people naturally endowed with the gift of recognizing the short way to conclusions, our imitators have, as a matter of course, outstripped us in the race to results. Fifteen years after the beginning of their experiment, they compiled their statistics. The Paris correspondent of the *Germania*, writing in August, 1891, says of these schools that "their corruption has to be acknowledged even by infidels and is irrefragably proven by the official returns of the French tribunals and the proceedings of the Chambers. Of course, in France, as in other countries, there are always crimes and suicides. But during the last few years these have increased to a terrible extent among the young

people." He cites the report of the Administration of Criminal Justice to show that the number of children and minors proceeded against increased by five thousand in a single year (23,000 in 1886 and 28,000 in 1887). Comparing the suicides of minors in 1875-76-77 with those in 1885-86-87, he says: "Whilst the general total of suicides in France increased between the two periods by 41.24 per centum, that of suicides under the age of twenty-one increased by 72.27 per centum." To give the exact figures, the suicides of minors were in the three years, 1875–76–77, 142, 196, 227. In the years 1885–86–87, they were 319, 324, 375. The amount of money already spent in establishing these schools of the new morality is, we are told, 689,496,000 francs.

The people, over there, are growing frightened. The schools that have held to the old morality had in 1876, 440,000 children. At the time of which we are speaking, 1891, they had 800,000. And you must remember that there has been no increase in the population of France. As for the relative cost of the two educations, take for instance, the large city of Lyons, where the children were divided about equally between the two kinds of schools: the schools of the new morality cost, in 1890, 2,401,032 francs, whilst the schools of the old morality cost 150,000 francs, or less than one-sixteenth. And this, moreover, whilst in the schools of the old morality the education was just as good as the other and, indeed, far better, because it was given by teachers who made a profession of teaching, who had been teaching for years, and who had been trained for the purpose.

The Methodist *Christian Advocate*, commenting on these facts, in February, 1891, under the heading "A suggestive fact from France," says: "Fifteen years ago, youthful criminals who could read were sixty-eight per cent: at present the percentage has arisen to seventy-eight per cent." The *Advocate* continues: "Our Protestant authority for this says that 'the evident failure, in a moral point of view, of education without religion is throwing weight into the Roman Catholic scale. Children are crowding their private schools. Schools without religion in a country, where homes are without God, can but raise up a godless generation.'"

Professor Fouillère, writing in the *Revue des deux Mondes* (May, 1897), about the actual condition of things, gives some facts and makes some reflections which ought to provoke us to very serious thought. He says: "In France, the increase of criminal cases over 1881 has been 30,000, though there has been practically no increase in the population. There has been especially an increase in the number of homicides and murders. . . . The saddest feature about this increase is that it has been proportionately greatest among the youth of the country. The actual fact is that the number of criminals, who are yet children or youths, is twice as large as the number of adult criminals; although France has only about seven million children and youths against twenty million adults. . . . . On all sides the warmest friends of education in France are entirely discouraged. . . . . Our present system of education dissipates instead of concentrating. . . It does not supply

the children with the principles that strengthen them against temptation. . . .''

Professor Harry Thurston Peck, editor of *The Bookman* and Professor of the Latin language in Columbia College, New York, speaking of France, says: ''Its (the Church's) conservative influence has been estranged, and its teachings, which are those that make for national security, have been blotted out of the education of modern France. The result is seen each year with more and more distinctness, and is a shocking example of what a purely secular training for the young can lead to.'' (*Bookman*, Dec., 1897.)

Facing this testimony concerning the results of our own experiment as it has been applied abroad, we are forced to ask,—how do we fare, ourselves? For an answer, take your daily papers of one year: add on your own observation of what did not get into the papers; add on what you may fairly conjecture has been the observation of a great population from sea to sea; sum up, for an illustration, the public crime, the hidden crime and the tolerated iniquity of a large city in the course of a year; consider the standard of honor avowed in the means adopted to secure the votes of the sovereign people; consider the value in dollars which it is calculated a sovereign people may be expected to put upon its voice in deciding the destiny of the commonwealth; consider the price laid down for the passage of a law which should be passed or rejected in justice on its own merits. I have no intention of going into details or of piling up statistics. I leave the matter to your

own individual judgment, to define what you know to be very widely the standard of virtue in private life, in domestic life, in public life.

It is just precisely what you know that has, as I said a while ago, startled some wise men from the dream in which they were planning easily—as we do in a dream—planning our future ideal section of the human family, brought up solely on the physico-intellectual programme, from the scissors and dumb-bells of the kindergarten to the wild athletics and intangible philosophy of the university,—but planning, all the while, with a negative indifference to, when not with a positive elimination of that most essential moral element in education, without which we cannot get the man that is needed in society.

They have been startled, I said, by the stern logic of results; and a movement is on foot for a general renovation. This awakening to a present need, this restless anxiety for the future, this new partial willingness to listen, the attempt that is actually being made to put some kind of a proposed remedy on trial, this is what I have called the Ethical Movement in Education. And here I may as well lay down, at once, my pedagogical thesis, which is that this ethical movement in education has been planned along paths by following which it is doomed inevitably to be a practical failure.

The line of argument by which this thesis is established is precisely analogous to that which we pursued when speaking of the general subject of pedagogics, and where we saw that physical and intellectual culture would not make the man, if the

moral element was excluded. So, also, no ethical or moral culture will produce practical morality in life, the thing we are looking for, if that ethical or moral culture excludes the one, sole, indispensable basis upon which the practical moral life can be built. And this one, sole, indispensable basis does not enter into the principles of the ethical movement.

In the July of 1897, the National Educational Association met in the city of Milwaukee. The call for the meeting resulted in one of the most largely attended educational conventions ever held in this country. It brought together an imposing array of delegates from the aristocracy of mind. The most forcible discussions of the Convention were those which elicited the recognition of a need for moral culture in education. In connection with the general assembly the National Herbart Society held its sessions, at which were read papers by distinguished educators of national fame. These papers were exclusively on the subject of moral training and ethics in education. What was particularly noticeable, however, in the scheme of papers to be presented and discussed was this, that the ultimate motive upon which alone practical morality can be effectively secured, was left out. This sole ultimate effective motive is religion, the recognition of a Supreme Lawgiver, whose will alone can give to every just law its binding force upon the hidden conscience. The one reason alleged for refusing to the one effective moral motive due acknowledgment of its value in a general scheme of education, including moral education, was clearly enunciated by a distinguished member, in the pro-

gress of the warmest discussion that took place during the sessions of the Assembly. This is the sentence containing the alleged reason: "I believe with him (the last speaker) that morality can be taught without religion."

Here, then, we may be permitted to draw the line between certain points of agreement and the point of disagreement. Those who have considered the matter seriously upon its practical side, affirm generally as being beyond dispute:

1. That practical morality in the various phases of the citizen's life, looked at in the broad aggregate of a population of seventy-five millions, has suffered a decline;

2. That the influences at work are not sufficient to stop the decline and prevent it from going on to one or another of the crises or calamities which form the dismal landmarks on the field of human history;

3. That this decline can be stopped only by providing some safeguard for the young, whilst character is in the process of formation;

4. That this safeguard can be provided only by inculcating upon the young those principles which ought to govern the conduct of man in all the phases of his life, private, domestic, social and civil;

5. That these principles are the principles of morality.

This is the agreement. The difference lies between an opinion, on the one hand, and on the other hand, a positive affirmation backed by facts and unanswerable argument. The opinion is, that morality

can be taught without religion. The positive affirmation is, that morality, a practical morality which is to be anything more than an ineffective, mental fiction, cannot be taught without religion. The whole point at issue lies right here; and the question demands a settlement upon the basis of fact and argument, and not upon the shifting uncertainties of mere opinion. The theoretical fiction of a morality without religion is lacking in what is essential to any kind of theory, namely, the hope, at least, of the possibility of its application to the matter under consideration. Eliminate religion as a factor in morality, and, first of all, you cannot formulate a complete code of morality; and, secondly, the diminished code which you may be able to formulate will have no more of motive in it to make a man observe it, than the mere objective knowledge of geography can have to make him travel around the world. It will have even less. There may be something in the travel to entice him. He may travel because he likes it. But with the purely objective moral code, the probabilities and the facts are a thousand against one that, when the occasion calls for the application of the code to his practical life, he will not like it.

However, the projectors of a morality without religion do not propose the fickleness of liking as their motive. The motive which they propose as enforcing morality without the factor of religion is the fitness or suitableness of the separate propositions of their moral scheme to the ideal humanity. Now, is there perceptible such fitness of the moral act to the ideal humanity? Undoubtedly, there is. We

ourselves lay the greatest stress upon that fitness, and we make the objective truth of that fitness *not the motive* but the *foundation for the real motive* which is to be found precisely and only in the religious element which the others have discarded as unnecessary. But the sole perception of the objective truth of the fitness of an individual moral proposition, as isolated from the religious motive for action, is in no wise of itself adapted to induce the concrete man to keep his life in order. Of course, if man were absolutely devoid of all passions and emotions, if he were rid of his body and free from every influence except the influence of the objective fitness perceived, if he were receptively nothing more than an intellectual mirror reflecting the objective truth, then we might perhaps begin to discuss the question. But that is not the kind of man we have under consideration; nor do we know of any one about us to whom the conditions would be applicable.

You can, it is true, *announce verbally* certain proximate moral truths without making *explicit* mention of religion. You can announce to the boys and girls that they ought to obey their parents and teachers, that they ought not to quarrel or lie or steal or murder, etc. But herein your "ought," if it be a real "ought," *implies* religion. However, you must make explicit mention of a motive. But if all mention of the one efficient motive is outlawed, what are you going to do? You may hold up to them the beauty of domestic peace and civil order. But the proposing of this objective beauty of the thing is not going to secure the result desired. If you leave out the

prime motive you cannot secure motion. You may teach a boy book-keeping, and tell him how becoming it will be for him to keep his father's books. He may answer you that your fitness is very lovely in the abstract, but that he finds it less jarring upon the conditions of his concrete humanity to go to the races and to live on his father's income. You may teach the boy music, and put before him the beautiful picture of the young man who stays at home of nights and plays the piano for company. But if he tells you that he admires your ideal and envies you your imagination, but that he feels his complex personality actually better fitted to play cards and to drink at the club, what will you say? You cannot reply.

So the mere objective knowledge of the fitness of some formulae of morality will not induce a man to arrange his life accordingly. It is not enough for you to tell a man that this is becoming and that that is becoming. He needs to know that the application of the formula of ideal fitness to his concrete existence is a duty imposed by law upon his free will by an authority that has a right to bind his free will, and that has also the power to vindicate that right. He needs to know that there is a binding force outside of and over and above the fitness. How many there are, especially in the beginning and without experience, who cannot reason philosophically to the importance of a moral deed, and yet who can sufficiently grasp that it is a duty imposed by a lawful authority. They accept the fitness as implied in the obligation.

If we descend from the higher law to the civil law, we shall find that this is precisely the principle upon which the civil law proceeds, and that it could not proceed otherwise. For the securing of public order and security and the common advantages of society, the civil authority does not wait until each and every citizen has considered and understood the general fitness of certain propositions, their economic and social advantage, importance, necessity. It does not even offer propositions and then wait until they are recognized as fit, looking for men to carry them out from the mere abstract knowledge of their fitness. How many would understand the philosophical fitness? When would it ever be possible to carry out any general design for the welfare of the social body? And even if a man did come to understand that a certain proposition was in harmony with the abstract ideal of human society, he would still be in need of a motive to apply the proposition to his own personal conduct. Moreover, the same man's ideal society may be a very variable one. It can easily be one thing when his coffers are full; and another, when his purse is empty. Hence, the civil authority knowing that there is something which the citizen does understand, namely, the duty of obedience to a real authority which possesses the power of a sanction for the keeper and the violator of its commands,—the civil authority, knowing this, simply *enacts laws*.

Now, to come back to the natural law, to the natural code of morality, you may pick out individual points and explain their beauty and fitness and order as much as you please, but in the mani-

festation of all this objective fitness and beauty, religion aside, you can never proclaim a law. The objective beauty of a deed as perceived does not constitute law to the will that is physically free to do the contrary. Law is the ordination of a superior. But the objective beauty and harmony of a deed are neither an ordination nor a superior. The mere objective deed as known has no authority over me, the physically free conscious ego. So that, if you wish to have a real motive for the observance of the moral order, you must have the seal of a superior, of the Supreme Lawgiver, put upon that order. Until you have that seal of command put upon the objective morality, you cannot call this morality law: and where there is no law, there is no obligation.

More than this. Unless you recognize in the authority that commands, the power of a just retribution that will be visited upon the subject who presumes freely to violate the law, that law will not have its effective binding force. A man may check himself in one vice through the motive of another. He may even play two vices, one against the other. He may, for instance, refrain from stealing a dollar, to-day, through the motive of purely human shame, dread of the judgment of his friends. To-morrow he may be able to lay his hands upon a hundred thousand dollars. He sees that he can make a theft so smooth that he will be able to slide it through the technicalities of the courts and so escape the penitentiary. But, the shame! Well, this time, shame may be in the light pan of the balance.

Man, therefore, needs—society, as society, needs

and must recognize—a comprehensive motive which can serve universally to all men for the complete code of morality. Leave out religion, and you cannot have that motive. Beauty, fitness, order cannot put on the character of law to be perceived by man as binding upon his will unless he recognizes his absolute dependence upon and his duty of reverence and obedience to a Supreme Lawgiver who wills the observance of the order that is due in the universe which He has created. And still further, if we wish to have an effective law, a law with a complete and sufficient sanction, we must recognize that our present conscious self is to live on hereafter and will be, even in its immortality, responsible to the Supreme Lawgiver for every broken law.

We are not contending, here, for a mere theory which we wish to have put on trial, to be accorded the privilege of an experiment as a change from some other theory which has proven itself unequal to the solution. We are contending for what we know to be the only basis for the practical moral life. We are contending for social order, for law with an incontrovertible and competent source, and with an effective sanction. We are contending for what we know to be the only means of securing order by the recognition of a truly binding force in law. And we know that if our position were calmly and seriously studied, there are millions, to-day most antagonistic to it, who would soon become its firmest adherents, and who would be anxious to enroll themselves amongst the most zealous and self-sacrificing

workers in promoting the sole saving help that can tide us over a crisis that has already begun. It may be said that the people do not see the crisis. The people never see the crisis. But the handwriting is on the wall: and there are a hundred thousand Daniels who have come forward to translate it into identical words. People are eating and drinking and making merry. So it was when the waters came and covered the earth; so it was that very night when the Assyrian came down on Babylon; so it was when Goth and Vandal swept over what was once the peaceful empire of Augustus; so it was when the guillotine sprang up like a mushroom in the night, right in the heart of the world's fashion and license; so comes the earthquake, the cyclone, the flood; so comes every disaster that befalls men and families and states.

Professor E. R. Morrison, of San Bernardino, California, writing in the *Educational Review* (November, 1897), said: "That some change in the educational system of the country is imperatively required seems to be generally admitted."

"It is an educational system which fails to educate."

"If our schools are doing their work efficiently, how comes it that our criminal statistics are the most terrible which the world has to show?"

At the National Prison Congress, opened on December 2d, 1897, at Austin, Texas, the President, General Roeliff Brinkerhoff, said in his address: "First and foremost what is essential is to revolutionize our educational system from top to bottom, so

that good morals, good citizenship, and ability to earn an honest living shall be its primary purposes, instead of intellectual culture as heretofore."

President Eliot, of Harvard, writes as follows in the *Outlook* (January, 1898): "No educational system can be successfully carried on without education in morals, and no education in morals is possible without a religious life."

Dr. Strong, Secretary of the Evangelical Alliance, writing in the *North American Review* (September, 1897), on "The Problem of the Twentieth Century City," says: "The problem of the twentieth century city, therefore, demands, for its solution, a higher type of citizenship, for which we must look chiefly to those who direct the education of the young."

Mr. Amasa Thornton, commenting upon the article of Dr. Strong, in the issue of the same Review for January, 1898, speaks thus: "On every side is heard the statement that there must be re-organization of society. Ten years ago the man who made that statement was considered an enemy to the public peace. To-day the statement is listened to by the people with respect, and accepted by many. . . .

"The questions we have to solve then are these: How can the present decline in religious teaching and influence be checked; and how can such teaching and influence be increased to such a point as will preserve the great cities of the next century from depravity, degradation, and destruction?

"If the adults of the present age are not as religious as the needs of the hour and of the future

require, will the children receive the proper religious training if they receive none except in the home circle? . . . . The average parent does not have the time, nor has he the inclination.

"The Catholic Church has insisted that it is its duty to educate the children of parents of the Catholic faith in such a way as to fix religious truths in the youthful mind . . . . . and although a Protestant of the firmest kind, I believe the time has come to recognize this fact, and for us all to lay aside religious prejudices and patriotically meet this question."

The words of Mr. Frederick Harrison may not be out of place here. This is what he writes in the *Forum* of December, 1891: "If there be such things as morality and religion, and if anything can be said or done by way of inculcating them, or applying them to life, then education cannot be severed from morality and religion, and all education must be inspired by religion as well as morality. . . . . I do not understand what systematic morality can mean if it have no religious direction at all. . . Morality apart from religion is a rattling of dry bones."

In the Methodist *Christian Advocate* (Sept. 16, 1897), there was an article on our subject bearing special reference to a circular which a contributor to the journal had sent out to about four hundred persons, ministers, professors, lawyers, editors. The purpose of the circular was to obtain independent answers to a number of serious questions. The writer stated that, in most cases, he knew nothing of the religious preference of those to whom he had

sent the request. He received about two hundred and fifty replies. It will be of service to us here to read the first six questions and the answers which he appends as gathered from the replies.

1. Is religious instruction necessary to a properly developed character?

YES.

2. If so, are the American youth receiving such education?

NO.

3. Is the Church (including the Sunday-school) accomplishing it?

NO.

4. Is the home accomplishing it?

NO.

5. Or are these two agencies combined (or any other agency) accomplishing it?

NO.

6. Is religious education necessary to good citizenship?

YES.

In the *Educational Review* (Feb., 1898), Dr. Levi Seeley of the State Normal School, Trenton, N. J., writing upon "Religious Instruction in American Schools," states that he had sent out the circular of which he wrote in the *Advocate*. In the *Educational Review* he gives a detailed account of the replies received, and makes his commentary. Dr. Seeley says: "The more educators come to recognize that there is a philosophy of education, the more profoundly convinced are they that there is something radically lacking in the American school system."

He remarks that "Young people are deplorably irreverent and careless concerning the deeper things of life, to say nothing of the graver and more criminal tendencies. The dense ignorance of sacred history and the teachings of the Bible is simply appalling." In the course of his article Dr. Seeley makes a computation which he bases upon the Sunday-school reports and the educational reports for the year 1896. Summing up, he says: "We shall have then about 9,500,000 children from five to eighteen years of age in the Sunday-school, or a little less than fifty per cent. of all the children of our country. The meaning of these figures is simply overwhelming. More than one-half of the children of this land now receive practically no religious instruction. For but few parents who fail to send their children to Sunday-school are careful about the religious training in the home. Even this feature does not show all of the truth. It seems to admit that the fifty per cent. who attend Sunday-school are receiving proper religious instruction; but every one knows that this cannot be granted."

It is very necessary that we should beware, at the critical juncture which all acknowledge we have now reached, that the discussion do not take on the form of a dispute between men, that is to say, of war between living, individual emotions, passions and prejudices. Individuals aside, we have to do what I said, in the beginning, is absolutely necessary for the serious treatment of any question. We must deal with the question upon its merits, we must

apply ourselves to study over again and to promote the free activity of those eternal principles which alone can re-establish and preserve the equilibrium of the individual life and of human society.

I know that there are estimable, thinking men who, from time to time, in their writings and their speech give utterance to principles which, if logically built upon in practical life, are subversive of all virtue and order. We find these men in their own practical lives to be much better than their principles. The principles are errors of speculation, whilst their lives are still guided under habit by a light that was kindled long ago in the very education they are speculatively contending against, an education which formed them to be the men they practically are because it laid so much stress upon the culture of the higher life. Still their own better lives do not hinder their speculative theories from being a menace and a danger, because these theories are taken up by personal admirers who do not think for themselves, and are used as general guides or maxims to mould the plastic mind of youth and to fix the character and conduct that are eventually reached by following the compass of the thought. And the consequence is, that erroneous speculative principles become to the community at large precisely that menace which the original propounders of the principles had it in their minds to avert.

Let us here instance the one-sided application of a single principle which is so persistently announced, namely, that "ignorance is the mother of

vice." As an abstract principle it is captivating, because it is so brief, so clear, so comprehensive. It seems to crystallize into a single axiom the entire method of morality. Eliminate ignorance and you have the virtuous child. Eliminate still more, and you have the virtuous father and mother, the virtuous family. With only virtuous families you will have none other than virtuous communities and municipalities. With virtuous municipalities thus made up of virtuous individuals, you have a nation of people without a vice. So teach, teach, teach anything right and left, have a great supply of branches and books and teachers, and you put humanity on the high road to sanctity. Now the fact is, that the principle, "ignorance is the mother of vice," without the proper modifications, distinctions and explanations, is false. As it has been very widely accepted, understood and applied, it is dangerous. In the fruit of its acceptance and application it is deplorable.

Without discrimination between knowledge and knowledge, between ignorance and ignorance, otherwise willing workers are accepting the principle as a contain-all. It is so comforting to have found an axiom that will rid one of the labor of thinking, and then to dispense algebra and poetry and color-boxes and object lessons on the passing clouds; and still more comforting to be able to congratulate oneself upon the way home with having fulfilled all the requirements of an apostle of morality and good citizenship. And do we not all know without a doubt that handwriting without the other thing in the heart is

the accomplishment of the forger; and that arithmetic without the other thing in the heart is the reliance of the defaulter? And do we not know most unfortunately, that, under the plea of dispelling ignorance, there are being introduced into the curriculum for young children, subjects which are not bringing about the physical well-being intended, whilst they are creating the moral disease which has gone before the downfall of every great civilization in the history of man?

It is a very false principle to work upon, the principle that ignorance is the mother of vice. Go into the homes of the poor, where father and mother and children are laboring for daily bread, where there is little arithmetic and less grammar, and no art or philosophy at all but the art of living according to the philosophy of conscience, and you will find illustrations of industry, sobriety, obedience to law, respect for parents, charity, tenderness, forgiveness, forbearance, kindness in judgment, modesty and unsullied purity, aureolas of virtue that are going to shame delegates from the four hundreds of four hundred Sodoms and Gomorrhas when Gabriel blows the horn. Will any one tell me that our ancestors, the barbarians, who broke up the license of the old Roman Empire were not on the whole better living men than those cultured imperialists of Italy and Greece and Africa and Asia Minor?—yea, even though they did not know how to make hexameter verses, though they had no rose water in the instruments of their toilets, and had not learned the hygienic value of a marble bath.

We have, therefore, made a strange experiment upon the individual human nature ; and, through it, upon the domestic, social and civil life of a people. It is an experiment which was never tried before by any people, but which has always been declared a peril by the wisest men of all nations in all the ages past. We have naturally, been anxious about the outcome of our experiment as imitated in France, Italy, and some few other fields. We see that, abroad, the experiment has worked to results more rapidly than with us. In France the experiment had its root in irreligion with irreligion for its aim. Here, the root and origin has not been irreligion, but religious difference and religious indifference, and the aim has been to effect a compromise by ignoring and ostracizing the whole subject of difference. The compromise is acknowledged to have been a very unsatisfactory one, dealing disadvantages all around, and no advantage.

Looking at the case, then, in the true light, it behooves us in a matter admittedly so grave, to judge with the same calm judgement which we are accustomed to apply to the minor, insignificant affairs of practical life. In the depths of our conscience we have to answer this question: Whether we can hope to send forth a moral, God-fearing people, a people fit to be entrusted with domestic management and the guardianship of the commonwealth, if they are trained up under the conviction that religion, the only basis of morality is a proscribed and outlawed thing during the best and brightest hours of the day through the tenderest and most impressionable years

of life. Without the only effective basis of practical morality, how are we to expect to have any other practical morality than that which the *Western Christian Advocate* (M. E.), of Cincinnati, has been telling us about in the year of grace, 1898? If we all have such a struggle with ourselves, even under the most favorable circumstances of religious influence and religious opportunity, to keep ourselves, I will not say in the path of perfection, but to bring ourselves every morning to the resolve or the desire of walking therein, what must be the untold struggle of those whose years from the very outset have been cut off and estranged from this only motive that can spur a man on steadily to keep his life in order?

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